Caribbean enforcement and its global reach: What the Venezuela case signals beyond Latin America

On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces conducted a large-scale strike on Caracas, captured Maduro, and transferred him to the United States to face federal narco-terrorism charges. Former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as acting president on January 5, after Venezuela's Supreme Court ordered her to assume the role. President Donald Trump stated that the United States would "run" Venezuela during a period of transition.

That announcement framed the operation as a discrete event. The evidence available by May 2026 suggests it was the most visible point in a campaign that began several months earlier and has continued without significant interruption.

A sustained campaign, not an isolated operation

The U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean began in mid-August 2025 under what was later identified as Operation Southern Spear. The first airstrike on a Venezuelan vessel in September 2025 resulted in 11 casualties. By late February 2026, publicly reported tallies indicated that U.S. forces had carried out at least 44 strikes against approximately 45 vessels, with more than 150 casualties reported. By late March, the figures had risen to 47 strikes and approximately 163 reported casualties, with the first strike on a land target inside Venezuela also recorded. By May, publicly reported casualty figures had exceeded 180, with some tallies placing the number higher.

The targets, according to U.S. statements, were vessels operated by groups designated as foreign terrorist organizations, including the Venezuelan group Tren de Aragua and the Colombian armed group ELN. The Pentagon has framed the operations as part of a "non-international armed conflict" with drug cartels, a characterization that combines counter-narcotics policy with authorities typically associated with counter-terrorism. The U.S. Senate twice rejected resolutions in 2025 that would have limited the executive's authority to continue the strikes. By the time of the January operation against Maduro, the legal and military framework for sustained Caribbean enforcement was already in place.

The integration of military, legal, and economic tools

What gives the Venezuela case its analytical weight is the way in which these tools appear to be operating together. The 2020 indictment of Maduro, expanded in early January 2026, served as the formal predicate for the operation that captured him. The military action produced the defendant. The legal process now proceeds in federal court in New York. The Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions framework governs access to Venezuelan revenues. The three tracks reinforce one another.

This integration appears to be creating a template. U.S. designations of foreign entities as terrorist organizations, combined with criminal indictments of their alleged leaders, can underpin sustained military action across a region without requiring a formal declaration of armed conflict or host-state consent. The State Department's designation of additional Latin American criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations in 2025 created conditions under which a similar approach could, in principle, be applied beyond Venezuela. Trump has signaled possible action against Colombia and has made escalating statements about Cuba, though no comparable operation has been publicly confirmed in either case.

Selective coalitions and fragmented regional responses

In 2026, the United States announced the Shield of the Americas, a security initiative aimed at coordinating military action against drug networks. Its composition is as notable as its mission. Major regional actors, including Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil, have not been part of the coalition, which suggests a model of regional security cooperation built around bilateral alignment with Washington rather than through inclusive hemispheric institutions.

Regional governments have responded differently. Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil condemned the January operation. Colombian President Gustavo Petro became the first foreign leader to visit Caracas after the events, in April 2026, characterizing the operation as an assault on regional sovereignty. Other governments, including those in Argentina, Ecuador, and Honduras following its November 2025 election, have aligned more closely with U.S. positions. The pattern points to regional fragmentation rather than a collective response, and it appears to be deepening as 2026 progresses.

Global implications

The features assembled in the Venezuela case touch on questions that are not regional in scope. Four implications, in particular, are likely to draw attention from observers outside Latin America.

The first concerns the threshold for the use of military force against non-state actors in foreign territory. The "non-international armed conflict" framing extends categories developed for counter-terrorism into a domain previously treated as law enforcement. If this framing settles into doctrine, it could expand the conditions under which a major power may act militarily without going through the UN Security Council or obtaining host-state consent.

The second involves the reach of unilateral designations. Designations made by a single government, such as foreign terrorist organization listings, are increasingly associated with direct operational consequences across borders. For states that have themselves been the subject of designations, sanctions, or watchlists, the development is directly relevant.

The third concerns the shift from institution-based to coalition-based security cooperation. The Shield of the Americas reflects a broader trend, visible in other regions as well, in which security arrangements are being assembled selectively rather than through established multilateral structures. Existing hemispheric institutions have not been the principal vehicle for the new framework.

The fourth concerns the practical reach of sovereignty as a protection. The combination of derecognition, military operation, domestic prosecution, and sustained enforcement against a foreign government's citizens illustrates how the protections that sovereignty traditionally offers can look narrower in practice than in formal doctrine. For middle and smaller states, this is the question of most direct relevance.

The Venezuela case, viewed in isolation, can be read as the resolution of a long-running confrontation between Washington and Caracas. Viewed against the developments of late 2025 and the first months of 2026, it may also represent the establishment of a regional precedent whose features could shape major-power policy in other settings. That is what May 2026 makes visible, and it is the part of the picture most relevant to readers outside the hemisphere.

Earlier, Qazinform News Agency reported on Venezuela’s political uncertainty months after Maduro’s removal from power.