Venezuela after Maduro: Transition prospects, sovereignty questions and U.S. policy goals

In the early hours of January 3, 2026, U.S. forces conducted a raid in Caracas. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured and transferred to the United States. Maduro was charged with four counts, including narco-terrorism conspiracy and cocaine-importation conspiracy, and both pleaded not guilty. President Donald Trump stated that the United States would "run" Venezuela during a period of transition. Former Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as acting president on January 5, after Venezuela's Supreme Court ordered her to assume the role and the military recognized her authority.

As of May 2026, the central question is no longer what happened in January, but what those events have produced. The political future is still contested, the economy is opening under changed sanctions conditions, and the legal proceedings against Maduro are at an early stage.

Removing Maduro did not produce a clear transition

The departure of a head of state does not automatically establish a functioning transition. Rodriguez has worked to consolidate her position, and analysts say her approach appears measured, taking steps toward reform while observing how U.S. priorities develop over the coming months. She has signed a bill granting foreign companies greater rights over the oil sector and released imprisoned dissidents. An amnesty law approved in February led to the release of 379 political prisoners, though opposition figures noted carve-outs that exclude those accused of facilitating foreign actions against Venezuela's sovereignty, a category the government has associated with opposition leader Maria Corina Machado.

The pace and scope of political change have drawn varied assessments, particularly from those who anticipated that Maduro's removal would be followed by a democratic handover. The government continues to be composed largely of officials from the existing political structure. The United States had previously recognized Edmundo González, widely believed to have won the disputed 2024 election, as Venezuela's legitimate leader, but after the January operation the administration set that position aside. Trump indicated that Machado lacked sufficient support to govern and signaled that stabilizing the country and securing access to its energy resources were the immediate priorities ahead of any election.

Sovereignty questions and international reactions

The operation produced sharp disagreement over its legality. Officials at the United Nations and several countries said the raid violated the UN Charter and Venezuela's sovereignty. Leaders of Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil condemned the intervention, though analysts questioned whether any would substantively push back against Washington. Regional positions largely tracked existing alignments.

International engagement has since evolved. In April 2026, Colombian President Gustavo Petro became the first foreign leader to visit Venezuela since the operation, meeting Rodriguez in Caracas, where the two governments pledged cooperation on security along their shared border. In May, Rodriguez traveled to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Netherlands, her first trip abroad since the January events, to defend Venezuela's claim in its territorial dispute with Guyana over the Essequibo region. She also publicly rejected suggestions that Venezuela might become a U.S. state, stating the country would continue to defend its sovereignty and independence.

The jurisdictional question over Maduro himself remains unresolved. His defense has signaled it will contest the legality of his arrest by arguing sovereign immunity, a defense unsuccessfully attempted by former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega after a comparable U.S. operation in 1990. Legal analysts say the case is unlikely to reach trial quickly given the complexity of the evidence, security considerations, and the prospect of extensive pretrial motions. Maduro's next court date is scheduled for June 30, 2026.

Oil sector: openings, controls, and complications

Opening Venezuela's oil sector to American companies has been central to U.S. policy, framed as both economic reform and a tool for stabilizing the acting government. On January 29, 2026, the U.S. Treasury issued General License No. 46, authorizing companies to engage in activities related to Venezuelan crude, including lifting, export, and transport. On February 10, relief was expanded through General License 48 to cover upstream exploration and production, following the National Assembly's approval of reforms to the Hydrocarbons Law.

The framework carries notable constraints. Payments cannot flow directly to sanctioned entities such as Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the state-owned oil company, but must pass through a U.S.-controlled account, and deals involving Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and certain Chinese entities are excluded. Critics argue these conditions effectively grant Washington oversight of a sovereign country's main revenue source. The China dimension adds complexity. China has historically been the largest purchaser of Venezuelan oil. The acting government has stated that oil pricing will follow international market rates rather than U.S. direction, signaling resistance to full American control.

Regional implications

Venezuela's situation carries consequences beyond its borders. The country has already generated one of the world's largest displacement situations, with more than seven million Venezuelans living abroad, and analysts note that a political shock does not automatically change migration patterns, which depend more on security conditions, economic signals, and public confidence. Reduced Venezuelan oil supplies have also placed pressure on Cuba, which long relied on that support.

What the situation looks like in May 2026

Venezuela is governed by a former vice president who holds power by a court order rather than an election, under what appears to be a conditional working relationship with Washington. Maduro, her predecessor, awaits trial in New York. The oil sector is partially open and an amnesty law has been enacted, but elections have not been scheduled and the democratic opposition holds no formal role.

The central question is less whether Maduro's removal was sufficient in itself, and more whether the conditions for a durable transition are taking shape. That involves more than revisions to the hydrocarbons law. It involves institutional reconstruction, credible electoral frameworks, and broad public confidence in the country's governing arrangements. These are slower to build than commercial agreements, and nearly five months on, they remain a part of the picture still being written.

Earlier, Qazinform News Agency reported that U.S. President Donald Trump said he would be the one to intervene in Cuba.