Houthi advance toward Bab el-Mandeb adds pressure to global trade routes

Between September 10 and 11, Houthi forces took Mocha, a Yemeni port on the Red Sea coast, and pushed south toward Bab el-Mandeb. Yemeni government authorities said they also reached Perim, or Mayyun, Island, which lies inside the strait and separates its two main shipping channels.

Government forces have since reported recovering some positions in Taiz governorate, leaving control of parts of the coast contested.

The significance of the offensive goes beyond territorial gains. Between 2023 and 2025, the Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, primarily threatened commercial shipping with missiles and drones. Their latest advance brings forces closer to the shipping lanes themselves.

This does not give the movement uncontested control of Bab el-Mandeb. It does, however, increase its ability to place sustained pressure on a route linking the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea with the Suez Canal and, from there, European markets.

UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg told the Security Council on September 10 that the escalation had ended the relative calm that followed the UN-brokered truce of April 2022. He described the situation as a “new and more dangerous phase” of the conflict.

Why the timing matters

The advance comes as another major energy route in the region is already under strain.

The conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel has disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea and a major route for global oil exports.

Saudi Arabia has consequently relied more heavily on the East-West Pipeline, which carries crude across the kingdom to Yanbu, its major oil terminal on the Red Sea coast.

That has increased the importance of Saudi Arabia’s western export route at the same time as instability has moved closer to the southern entrance of the Red Sea.

On September 11, the Saudi Ministry of Energy said the East-West Pipeline had been shut as a precaution following attacks. The Saudi Foreign Ministry later said the drones involved had been launched from Iraq.

The combination creates pressure across two connected routes. Disruption around Hormuz raises the importance of Red Sea exports, while instability near Bab el-Mandeb makes those alternatives less secure.

The Houthis have also been in a direct confrontation with Riyadh. The movement declared a maritime embargo on Saudi Arabia on July 20 after an airstrike on Sanaa International Airport that Yemen’s internationally recognized government said it had carried out.

Houthi officials say their campaign is linked to restrictions on ports and airports in areas under their control. Saudi authorities have described the attacks as an escalation, while the Saudi-led coalition said strikes on southern cities injured 73 civilians.

Iran maintains that the Houthis act independently, while Yemen’s government has called for stronger enforcement of restrictions on weapons reaching the movement.

Pressure without closing the strait

The Houthis have so far indicated that they are not seeking to stop all traffic through Bab el-Mandeb.

In a statement issued on September 11, the movement said navigation remained safe for companies other than Saudi vessels. It has also denied plans to charge ships transit fees.

This suggests that the current strategy is aimed primarily at increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia rather than closing the waterway altogether.

The economic consequences can still extend well beyond the kingdom.

Commercial operators respond not only to declared targeting policies, but also to the broader security environment. Fighting close to major shipping lanes can affect insurance costs, routing decisions and the willingness of vessels to continue using the route.

Before the Red Sea shipping crisis began in late 2023, around 9 million barrels of oil per day passed through Bab el-Mandeb, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

The humanitarian impact inside Yemen is also growing. The International Organization for Migration said more than 85,000 people had been displaced as of September 13, most of them from the western coast. More than 2,000 people had also crossed the Red Sea to Djibouti, a country on the opposite side of Bab el-Mandeb from Yemen.

Saudi Arabia faces a difficult choice

The latest developments leave Riyadh with a difficult balance.

Saudi Arabia has spent several years reducing its direct military involvement in Yemen and supporting efforts to move the conflict toward negotiations. A renewed large-scale military campaign would challenge that policy.

At the same time, negotiations conducted while Saudi infrastructure and shipping are under pressure could strengthen the Houthis’ belief that escalation produces political leverage.

For the movement, this means that formally closing Bab el-Mandeb may not be necessary. The ability to increase uncertainty around the strait can itself raise the economic and political costs of confrontation.

Why it matters for Kazakhstan

For Kazakhstan, the crisis is another example of how instability at distant maritime chokepoints can affect trade and energy markets far beyond the Middle East.

Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal form part of an interconnected trade route between Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Pressure on several of these passages at the same time can increase freight costs, lengthen delivery routes and add uncertainty to energy markets.

Higher oil prices can support Kazakhstan’s export revenues in the short term. At the same time, repeated disruptions to maritime trade strengthen the case for diversified transport corridors.

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, connects Central Asia with the South Caucasus and Europe through rail, sea and road links.

The latest fighting does not mean the Houthis control Bab el-Mandeb. It does, however, move the conflict closer to the chokepoint itself and gives the movement a more direct form of leverage over an important global trade route.

The wider regional confrontation will shape what happens next. The more pressure there is on Hormuz, the more strategically important Bab el-Mandeb becomes.

Earlier, Qazinform reported that Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Energy announced the "precautionary closure" of the East-West Pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions.