From bilateral partnership to coordination of middle powers - a new stage in Kazakhstan– Türkiye relations

- Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s speech at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum was important not merely because the President of Kazakhstan once again spoke at one of the region’s key international platforms. More significant was the political framing of the speech. In Antalya, Kazakhstan presented itself not simply as a state friendly to Türkiye or as a participant in the Turkic world, but as a responsible middle power seeking to engage in broader discussions about the global order - from the crisis of UN effectiveness to the role of middle powers, strategic restraint, and a new architecture of Eurasian connectivity. Antalya demonstrated not just a high level of bilateral relations, but a transition toward deeper strategic coordination.

What, in your view, was the main impression left by Tokayev’s speech at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum?

- In my opinion, the main impression is that Kazakhstan spoke in Antalya not from the position of an observer, but as a state that aspires to political agency on a broader international scale. Tokayev did not limit himself to general formulas about peace and dialogue. He addressed a much more complex set of issues: the crisis of UN effectiveness, the need to reform the Security Council, the growing role of middle powers, and the importance of strategic restraint amid conflicts that have long ceased to be purely regional. For a diplomatic audience, this is an important signal. It means that Astana seeks to be not only a reliable partner, but also an independent participant in the conversation about the future of the international order.

It seems particularly noteworthy to me that in Türkiye, Tokayev spoke in the language of responsibility rather than demonstrative geopolitical ambition. This is a very mature approach. It shows that Kazakhstan aims to strengthen its international role not through sharp gestures, but through pragmatism, restraint, and the ability to be an acceptable interlocutor for different sides. These are precisely the qualities that today define the weight of middle powers.

Kazakhstan is increasingly perceived as a state that is strengthening its own political and diplomatic agency. In recent Turkish publications, one can already trace the idea that Tokayev’s domestic reforms are reinforcing the country’s external position. This is important, because international influence is rarely built solely on foreign policy. It is usually the result of a combination of internal stability, institutional reforms, and a clear foreign policy course.

Looking more broadly, in Antalya Tokayev spoke not as a politician who simply needed to signal presence at a forum. He spoke as someone who understands the structure of the international system and the limits of its current effectiveness. This, too, adds weight to his position. Among Turkish audiences, such a manner is perceived positively because it does not appear decorative - it appears professional and substantive.

Why is Kazakhstan today important for Türkiye not only as a “brotherly country,” but also as a strategic partner?

- Because in recent years, the bilateral agenda has become far more institutionalized and practical. Between Türkiye and Kazakhstan there is now a whole set of stable mechanisms: the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, the Joint Strategic Planning Group, the economic commission, and regular political consultations. In February 2026, the foreign ministers of the two countries signed a cooperation plan for 2026–2027. This is already a sign not just of warm relations, but of a systemic architecture of interaction.

I would add another point. In Turkish analytical discourse, one increasingly hears the idea that Kazakhstan is no longer a peripheral participant in the Turkic world, but one of its key centers. Kazakhstan has evolved from simply a stable investment partner into a strategic ally of Türkiye and is a key link in Central Asia. This is a telling formulation - it clearly reflects the shift in how Kazakhstan is perceived in Türkiye.

To what extent does the Middle Corridor strengthen Kazakhstan’s importance for Türkiye?

- It strengthens it very significantly. In my view, this is precisely where Kazakh–Turkish relations acquire a long-term strategic dimension. The Middle Corridor is no longer just about transit. It is about what Eurasian connectivity will look like amid the conflict in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and the broader fragmentation of the global economy. In this context, Kazakhstan occupies a central position, because it is impossible to imagine a stable east–west link between Central Asia, the Caspian region, the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and Europe without it.

I find persuasive the idea that the Middle Corridor should be understood not as a narrow infrastructure route, but as a broader integration platform. This corridor should develop on an inclusive basis, bringing together the interests of Turkish, European, Caucasian, and Central Asian participants. It is not limited to railways and highways; it also includes energy lines, ports, digital networks, and a broader architecture of stability and prosperity. In this sense, for Türkiye, Kazakhstan is not merely a transit territory, but one of the key co-authors of this entire framework.

What role can Kazakhstan and Türkiye play in this new configuration as middle powers?

- I think this was one of the most interesting themes in Antalya. Tokayev very rightly emphasized the role of middle powers. Today, the international system is experiencing a crisis not only because of wars and conflicts, but also due to the declining effectiveness of major institutions and the inability of great powers to produce solutions to key issues. In such a situation, the importance of countries with sufficient diplomatic weight - yet retaining flexibility, pragmatism, and the ability to engage with different centers of power - increases. Türkiye and Kazakhstan fall precisely into this category.

I would say that the alignment of diplomatic instincts is particularly important here. Both Ankara and Astana are interested in preventing the international system from sliding fully into rigid confrontation. Both Türkiye and Kazakhstan are interested in maintaining channels of dialogue, developing multilateralism, supporting transport and energy connectivity, and reducing risks to trade and security. That is why their coordination today appears not situational, but quite natural.

What, in your opinion, will the upcoming visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Kazakhstan signify?

- If this visit is substantive, it could become a very important event. During a panel session in Antalya, Tokayev directly stated that Kazakhstan expects a state visit by Erdoğan as early as next month. In my view, this creates an opportunity to elevate the current rapprochement to an even higher level - from close partnership to more deeply institutionalized strategic interaction. This is especially true if the agenda includes not only general political statements, but also concrete decisions on trade, investment, transport, energy, defense industry, and Turkic multilateral formats.

The significance of such a visit will extend beyond the bilateral dimension. It could demonstrate that Kazakhstan and Türkiye are ready to act not only as close partners, but as states that are shaping a shared vision of regional order. Today’s forum has already provided the political framework for this. Now much will depend on how effectively both sides can translate this symbolic moment into a practical program for the coming years.

Earlier, Qazinform News agency shared an interview with Professor Süleyman Kiziltoprak, in which he spoke about the significance of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Türkiye going beyond protocol diplomacy and its role in shaping a new Eurasian architecture.