Kazakhstan should build on its strengths in critical minerals, says expert

Kazakhstan should build on its existing mining and metallurgical expertise and use critical minerals partnerships to secure financing, technology transfer and investment in commercially viable processing at home, Dinara Berdigulova, a Doctor of International Affairs candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said in an exclusive interview with a Qazinform News Agency correspondent.

photo: QAZINFORM

Where does Kazakhstan have the strongest competitive advantage in critical minerals? Which minerals could attract investment in the near term and where is more exploration needed before projects can move forward?

I believe Kazakhstan’s strongest competitive advantage lies in minerals it already mines and processes, rather than necessarily in those attracting the greatest geopolitical attention. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and has established capabilities in copper, chromium, ferroalloys, titanium, and several rare metals, including beryllium and tantalum. Its advantage comes not only from geological resources but also from industrial infrastructure, technical expertise, and international commercial relationships.

The Indonesia case provides a useful theoretical explanation. Khalil and Broughel (2025) show that Indonesia achieved much greater downstream development in stainless steel than in EV battery manufacturing: stainless steel exports rose from $564 million in 2017 to $11.85 billion in 2022, while battery component exports fell 36% between 2014 and 2022. This is consistent with product space theory: countries are generally better positioned to diversify into products requiring capabilities related to those they already possess. For Kazakhstan, deeper metallurgy, specialized metal products, and selected refining activities may offer more realistic opportunities than immediately attempting complete battery or permanent-magnet manufacturing industries.

Tungsten is a particularly promising near-term example. The Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty project, involving US-based Cove Capital and Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk, illustrates how foreign investment can support domestic processing. The joint venture has a reported 70%–30% ownership structure and plans to produce ammonium paratungstate in Kazakhstan rather than export unprocessed ore (Samruk-Kazyna, 2026). Its definitive feasibility study is scheduled for completion by the end of 2027; these plans remain subject to project execution and financing.

Photo credit: Dinara Berdigulova's personal archive

Other opportunities include copper smelting, recovery of gallium and other by-products from existing metallurgical operations, and modernization of established uranium and titanium facilities. For rare earth elements, lithium, and nickel, I would be more cautious: geological discoveries do not automatically translate into economically viable deposits. Further exploration, internationally recognized resource assessments, metallurgical testing, and feasibility studies are needed.

My conclusion is that Kazakhstan should prioritize industrial upgrading where it already has capabilities while investing in exploration and technical knowledge for future opportunities. Comparative advantage should be assessed at each stage of the value chain, not simply by deposit size.

What should Kazakhstan seek in critical minerals agreements with the United States and other partners? How should it weigh access to financing, technology and buyers against its goal of processing more minerals at home?

I believe Kazakhstan should negotiate for technological and economic capabilities, not simply for foreign-owned processing plants. Lessons learnt from other countries argued that a smelter’s location does not establish who owns it or captures its returns. Indonesia moved substantial nickel processing onshore, yet Chinese firms controlled roughly three-quarters of its nickel refining capacity as of 2023, along with much of the technology and financing.

Khalil and Broughel (2025) demonstrate that Indonesia’s nickel policies expanded stainless steel production, but the transition toward EV battery manufacturing was more difficult. Domestic financial participation was also greater in stainless steel: 10 of 19 smelter loans involved Indonesian companies, whereas battery projects relied exclusively on foreign financing. This association alone does not establish causation. World Bank research by Kee and Xie (2025) finds that nickel export restrictions increased domestic value added in downstream exports but also generated efficiency losses. More processing does not necessarily mean higher productivity, greater domestic ownership, or technological independence.

I would seek six elements: (1) commercially viable domestic processing commitments, based on project economics rather than blanket rules; (2) Kazakhstani equity and lender participation in each major project; (3) measurable technology transfer, technical training, research cooperation, and local supplier development; (4) long-term offtake agreements with price protection, which make projects bankable; (5) low-carbon power and enforceable environmental standards; and (6) transparent contracts and meaningful community participation.

Indonesia’s energy-intensive nickel processing also illustrates the environmental risks of reliance on captive coal: as of 2023, 132 captive coal plants with 15.2 GW of capacity were operating (Khalil and Broughel, 2025). Kazakhstan’s coal-heavy power system makes electricity cost and carbon intensity central to the competitiveness of future processing investments. I would not advocate a blanket export ban: Indonesia’s approach encouraged investment but also generated trade disputes and efficiency costs, and its market power in nickel cannot be generalized to Kazakhstan’s minerals.

Instead, I would favor sequenced industrial development. Where processing is economically feasible, negotiate local value addition from the outset. Where technology or markets are not yet developed, establish realistic milestones for training, pilot production, and future processing. Chile’s lithium strategy combines state participation with private investment, and the OECD (2025) stresses that its value-addition ambitions depend on technological feasibility, environmental constraints, and investment incentives. The ultimate objectives should be domestic value added, domestic value capture, and domestic technological capability—three related but distinct outcomes.

Australia’s critical minerals framework with the United States links strategic cooperation with project development. Which mechanisms in such agreements could support financing for mining and processing projects in Kazakhstan?

The most useful feature of the October 2025 Australia–United States framework is its attempt to connect strategic cooperation with identifiable projects, financing instruments, and deadlines. Both governments announced measures to provide at least $1 billion each in financing for priority critical minerals projects within six months (White House, 2025), and EXIM issued seven letters of interest worth $2.2 billion (Export-Import Bank of the United States, 2025). The framework also envisages loans, guarantees, equity, insurance, offtake arrangements, pricing mechanisms, geological cooperation, and permitting coordination. Announced financing and letters of interest are not the same as binding commitments or disbursements.

Of these mechanisms, two matter most for Kazakhstan. The first is offtake with price protection. Lenders finance a mine or processing plant only when a credible buyer and a predictable price are in place, and tungsten and rare earth prices are exposed to oversupply from dominant producers. The second is guarantees and political risk insurance from export credit agencies and development finance institutions. Kazakhstan’s country risk and transit dependence raise its cost of capital in a way Australia’s do not, and these instruments lower it directly.

I would also propose a jointly selected pipeline of commercially promising projects, beginning with tungsten and expanding where geological and feasibility information supports investment. The tungsten project shows the starting point: EXIM has issued a letter of interest for up to $900 million and the US International Development Finance Corporation for up to $700 million, but neither is committed until the feasibility study and final investment decision are complete. The priority is to convert that interest into signed loans alongside offtake contracts.

Public and private partners could also finance enabling infrastructure, geological exploration, pilot processing, specialized equipment, and applied research. Strategic co-investment by Kazakhstani institutions, as in Tau-Ken Samruk’s participation in the tungsten venture, provides a governance role and a share in returns (KAZAKH INVEST, 2026). A standing bilateral coordination mechanism should track progress from feasibility through final investment decision, construction, and operation.

Australia has deeper capital markets and a longstanding US security alliance, so Kazakhstan cannot simply copy its model. The framework is also nonbinding. I would avoid exclusivity terms that undermine Kazakhstan’s established commercial relationships with China, Russia, Europe, and other partners. For Kazakhstan, fewer but firmer commitments—identifiable projects, credible buyers, clear financing structures, and measurable deadlines—would be more valuable than broad political announcements.

How effective have international raw materials partnerships, including those between the European Union and resource-rich countries, been in attracting investment in local processing and workforce development? What factors have supported implementation, and what obstacles have delayed progress?

I would characterize international raw materials partnerships as limited and uneven so far, particularly against their ambitious industrial development objectives. EU partnerships with Kazakhstan, Chile, Namibia, Rwanda, and other resource-rich countries emphasize sustainable extraction, local value addition, research, innovation, and skills. Yet the gap between political commitments and implementation remains substantial.

The European Court of Auditors (2026) concluded that the EU’s efforts to diversify imports “have yet to produce tangible results.” The EU concluded 14 strategic partnerships between 2021 and mid-2025, yet imports from partner countries fell between 2020 and 2024 for 13 of the 27 raw materials examined. This does not mean that every partnership failed to create local investment, but it shows how far outcomes lag behind commitments. The 2025 ÖFSE study by Küblböck and colleagues, examining Kazakhstan, Chile, and Rwanda, identifies insufficiently specific commitments to local value addition, fragmented financing, limited transparency, and weak implementation benchmarks.

Kazakhstan’s EU partnership, signed in 2022, has led to cooperation roadmaps and initiatives in geological exploration, research, and technical cooperation. These are useful steps, but they must be distinguished from operating large-scale processing facilities and demonstrated workforce outcomes.

Three factors have supported implementation where progress has occurred. The first is host-country policy: Chile exports lithium in processed form because of its own contract conditions and earlier industry development, not because of its EU partnership. The second is dedicated public finance in a named project, such as the EBRD’s 17% equity stake in Kazakhstan’s Sarytogan Graphite (Küblböck et al., 2025). The third is an existing mining base with reliable geological data and stable investment conditions.

Indonesia offers an example of actual downstream expansion, although the results differed sharply between stainless steel and batteries; the first loan for battery manufacturing came only in 2022, eight years after the export ban took effect. Outside the EU framework, the DRC–Zambia battery initiative (Mayani, Davis, and Ramdoo, 2026) shows the appeal of regional value chains but also the barriers posed by electricity reliability, logistics, regulatory coordination, and skills. Across cases, the main obstacles that have delayed progress are financing, technology access, infrastructure, differing objectives between importers and producers, and weak measurement of workforce outcomes.

I would evaluate agreements by completed investments, competitive processing capacity, local technical employment, research partnerships, domestic suppliers, and environmental performance. The EU’s goal of processing 40% of its annual strategic raw material consumption domestically by 2030 also raises a question about the distribution of downstream opportunities between Europe and partner countries. International partnerships cannot substitute for domestic industrial policy, credible investment conditions, and institutional capacity.

How can Kazakhstan diversify its critical minerals partnerships while maintaining existing trade ties? Over the next five years, what concrete results would show that these agreements are delivering lasting benefits for the country?

Kazakhstan should pursue diversification without replacing one dependency with another. Its multivector foreign policy provides a foundation for maintaining ties with China, Russia, the EU, the United States, and others. Diversification should encompass ownership, financing, technology, and final markets—not only the number of partner countries.

Kazakhstan could cooperate with US investors on tungsten, European institutions on geological research and selected processing technologies, and existing buyers on competitive mineral products. Common standards for resource reporting, traceability, product quality, and environmental performance can improve access to multiple markets. The Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor may offer additional export options, but its usefulness depends on cost, capacity, and reliability.

The DRC–Zambia battery initiative also suggests possibilities for Central Asian cooperation in electricity, logistics, mineral-processing services, and technical training. Regional value chains should be based on complementary capabilities and commercial rationale, not simply diplomatic ambition.

By 2031, I would look for seven concrete results:

· Preliminary financing interest has turned into binding agreements, disbursements, and final investment decisions.

· Tungsten, copper, or by-product processing capacity is operating or under construction.

· Ownership is transparent and local participation is meaningful.

· More Kazakhstani engineers hold technical and management positions.

· More deposits have internationally recognized resource assessments.

· Buyers and markets have diversified.

· Energy use, emissions, water, waste, and remediation obligations are publicly reported.

Targets for domestic equity and market concentration should be set project by project, based on each project’s economics, rather than as universal thresholds. What matters is whether domestic companies and engineers acquire capabilities they can use beyond one foreign investment. The success of agreements should be measured by competitive industries, skilled workers, technological knowledge, and durable economic opportunities—not simply signed memoranda or headline investment figures.

In conclusion,the comparative evidence from Indonesia, Chile, Australia, and the DRC–Zambia initiative suggests that mineral wealth alone does not guarantee industrial upgrading. Indonesia demonstrates both the potential and costs of resource nationalism; Chile highlights the balance between national participation and investment incentives; Australia shows how strategic cooperation can support project-level finance; and DRC–Zambia illustrates the opportunities and constraints of regional value chains.

For Kazakhstan, the objective should not be to maximize domestic processing at any cost, but to maximize sustainable domestic value creation, productivity, technological capability, and economic resilience. The decisive question is who captures the value and develops the capabilities that remain after foreign investment projects are established.

Earlier, Qazinform News Agency reported that a plant combining wind, solar and battery storage could meet 70% to 90% of a typical electricity demand profile in Kazakhstan at a lower cost than new coal power. Ember analyst Kostantsa Rangelova discussed the findings in an exclusive interview.